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PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM IN AUSTRALIA: 
A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL*
Binh Tran-Nam and Linh Vu 
Australian School of Taxation (Atax) 
University of New South Wales 
Sydney Australia
Brian Andrew 
School of Law and Business 
Charles Darwin University 
Darwin Australia
Australian personal income tax (PIT) currently faces major problems. Recent calls 
for PIT reform have been made from many quarters of Australian society. This 
paper reports on some early findings of an ARC Linkage project on PIT reform. 
In the first phase of this project, STINMOD, a microsimulation model, is used to 
construct and test a series of hypothetical PIT packages in order to establish which 
packages can best deliver the required policy outcomes. Under the principles of 
revenue-neutrality and incrementality, a preferred PIT package with a broader tax 
base and a flatter tax rate structure is derived. It is shown that this PIT proposal 
outperforms the current PIT with respect to all traditional criteria for good tax 
policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The governments of developed economies have been employing personal income 
taxation (PIT) as an important means to raise public revenue. PIT wields considerable 
influence over the three dimensions of public policy, namely resource allocation, 
income redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation. In terms of aggregate revenue, 
PIT has been the most important single tax in most Organisation of Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) countries.1 This is particularly true in the case 
of Australia, which has traditionally relied on PIT as its most significant source 
* This paper is derived from an ARC Linkage Project undertaken at Atax. Financial 
support from the ARC and CPA Australia is gratefully acknowledged. Comments from 
Garry Addison and Chris Evans, and from two anonymous referees helped to improve 
the paper. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors.
1 In 2003, PIT (including social security contributions by employees) accounted, on 
average, for 33.4% of total tax revenue in OECD countries, making it the largest revenue 
source in the OECD (OECD, 2007: 60–61).
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of revenue for the Commonwealth Government in particular and the government 
sector in general. PIT directly affects a large part of the Australian population, as 
currently about 55 per cent of the Australian population is required to lodge tax 
returns on an annual basis.2
Since the mid 1980s, many OECD countries have engaged in fundamental 
PIT reforms. These reforms have been driven by the efficiency criterion of good 
tax policy and, to a much lesser extent, equity and simplicity considerations. 
Australia’s PIT reform has largely followed the OECD norm. In the 1980s and 
1990s, the ALP Federal Government introduced a number of significant tax policy 
and administration reforms. These include, for example, tax base broadening (for 
example, the introduction of the Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and Fringe Benefits Tax 
(FBT) and the removal of a number of major tax concessions in 1985), significant 
reduction in PIT rates, self assessment and attempts to simplify the income tax law 
(for example, the Tax Law Improvement Project).
Since it was first elected to office in 1996, the Federal Coalition Government 
has been preoccupied with indirect and business tax reform. In fact, the re-election 
of the Howard Government in 1998 on the platform of a broad-based consumption 
tax reform proposal was unprecedented in Australia’s federal history. Since the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on 1 July 2000,3 the Coalition 
Government has not appeared to have any concrete plan for systemic PIT tax reform. 
In order to fulfill its election tax package, the Howard Government has moved the 
thresholds for the top tax brackets upward and reduced the top marginal PIT rates in 
recent Budgets.4 However, the basic structure of the Australian PIT system (in terms 
of tax base, tax rate and tax administration) has remained largely unchanged.
There has been a growing recognition in Australia that the process of tax 
reform is an unfinished business. Recent calls for PIT reform have been repeatedly 
made from virtually all sectors of the Australian community, including academia, 
think tanks, professional organisations, business and welfare lobbies, religious 
institutions and the political parties themselves (see, for example, ACOSS, 2003; 
Business Coalition for Tax Reform, 2005; Business Council of Australia, 2005; 
CPA Australia, 2004; Freebairn, 2005; Humphreys, 2005, Saunders, 2006, Tran-
2 In the tax year 2003–04, about 11.0 million individual taxpayers lodged returns (ATO, 
2006: 7) while the corresponding population was approximately 20.0 million (ABS, 
2006a: 104, Table 5.1).
3 The introduction of the GST was not completely successful. Following the introduction 
of the GST, the real GDP growth rate declined markedly from 3.8% in 1999–2000 to 
2.1% 2000–01 (ABS, 2006a: 667, Table 29.1).
4 Despite the Howard Government’s pledge of revenue-neutral tax reform, the overall tax 
burden (tax revenue relative to GDP) increased from 31.5% in 1999–2000 to 32.0% in 
2000–01, but fell to 31.6% in 2003–04 (ABS, 2006a: 647, Table 27.13 and 670, Table 
29.5). Thus, the recent PIT cuts could be seen as the Government’s attempt to maintain 
revenue neutrality.
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Nam et al., 2006; Turnbull and Temple, 2005). All of these calls have two points in 
common. Firstly, the current Australian PIT performs poorly in relation to the three 
traditional criteria for good tax policy, namely, equity, efficiency and simplicity. 
Secondly, a comprehensive, systemic reform is required to produce a sustainable 
PIT–transfer system that can generate sufficient revenue, protect the needy and yet 
deliver enhanced equity, efficiency, simplicity and transparency.
However, when it comes to the details, there is little agreement. In fact, the 
specific proposals appear to vary quite considerably, ranging from a radical, flat 
tax proposal (see Humphreys, 2005) to more conventional PIT reform proposals 
(see Turnbull and Temple, 2005). Perhaps the views put forward by researchers 
associated with the Centre of Independent Studies and published collectively in a 
single volume edited by Saunders (2006) are the most radical. Their main arguments 
and proposals can be summarised as follows:
(a) Australia is not a low-taxing country in view of either the weighted average 
level of taxation in the OECD or Australia’s main trading partners. Also, 
Australia has a comparatively high reliance on income taxation.
(b) The government could get more revenue by cutting top marginal PIT rates 
(that is, Australia is currently on the falling side of a Laffer curve).
(c) Families should be allowed to choose whether or not to pool part or all 
of their incomes for tax purposes (that is, the tax unit can be either the 
individual or the family).
(d) Individuals should be allowed to earn at least a subsistence income before 
paying any income tax (that is, the tax free threshold should be substantially 
raised and indexed to inflation).
(e) A proportionate income tax system is fair while a progressive income tax is 
not.
(f) The preferred PIT–transfer reform package is a flat tax at 30 per cent, 
together with a very high tax free threshold and a negative income tax.
The primary purpose of this paper is to report some findings of an ongoing 
Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage project on PIT reform, currently being 
undertaken by a research team at the Australian School of Taxation (Atax) of the 
University of New South Wales. Atax’s industry partner for this project is CPA 
Australia, which has an active and long-standing interest in tax reform in Australia. 
However, it should be emphasised from the outset that this project is conducted 
by Atax researchers whose work is completely independent of CPA Australia. The 
emphasis of this paper is on the modelling aspect of the project. In particular, a 
“preferred” PIT reform package will be derived, proposed and discussed.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview of Australia’s current PIT system. It also briefly reviews some of the 
well-known key defects of the Australian PIT system. Section 3 outlines the general 
principles and specific aims of the reform strategy, while Section 4 discusses the 
research methodology of the project. Section 5 presents a specific PIT reform 
package derived from a microsimulation exercise using STINMOD 05B. It is 
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shown that this package outperforms the current PIT system with respect to the 
traditional criteria for good tax policy. Some final remarks will then be provided 
in the concluding section.
2. OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT PERSONAL  
INCOME TAXATION
Although PIT can be constitutionally levied by State Governments, the Com-
monwealth of Australia has been the sole imposer of PIT since 1942.5 The PIT is 
collected by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in accordance with the Income 
Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1936 (Cth), ITAA 1997 (Cth) and others, including the 
Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth). There are effectively three sources of taxation 
law in Australia:
• statute law (or legislation) made by the Parliament and contained in statutes 
such as the ITAA 1936 and ITAA 1997, along with regulations made under 
such Acts;
• case law (or common law) created by the decisions of courts and tribunals, 
and
• ATO practice and rulings (that is, the ways in which the ATO administers and 
applies the law through rulings, assessments and enforcement practices).6
The tax unit in Australia is the individual, although there are tax rebates to reflect 
demographic differences between families. Further, some classes of income may 
be split (property and business income) while others may not (wages and salaries; 
there is still some ambiguity regarding the treatment of personal services income, 
which may vary depending on the precise nature of the recipient entity). Thanks to 
the base broadening reforms of the 1980s, the definition of assessable income is now 
more comprehensive and includes earnings from employment or self-employment, 
rental income, interest, dividend income, capital gains, social security payments 
(unless exempted), etc.7 Double taxation of dividend income is avoided through 
the imputation system, which provides franking credits to resident shareholders. 
However, tax on business and investment income can often be reduced via the 
use of entities such as partnerships, companies and trusts. In addition, as in most 
5 In 1942, the Commonwealth seized control of income tax under the Defence Power 
granted by s51(vi) of the Commonwealth Constitution and introduced the “uniform 
taxation system” which still operates today. Under this system, the States ceased to collect 
income taxes in order to receive grants from the Commonwealth. If any State Government 
attempts to collect any amount of income tax, its grant from the Commonwealth would 
be reduced by the same amount. It is thus not politically viable for any State Government 
to impose income taxes.
6 From a legal purist perspective, the Commissioner’s rulings are not law but merely 
represent his view of the law.
7 Employees’ fringe benefits do not form part of their taxable income as they are specifically 
taxed under the Fringe Benefits Tax.
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countries, owner-occupied housing is treated preferentially via a CGT exemption 
and the non-inclusion of imputed rental income in the tax base, but interest on 
borrowing to finance such properties is not tax deductible and State governments 
impose stamp duty on housing purchases. In addition, there are many allowable 
deductions and concessions in the PIT system for individual non-business taxpayers, 
such as work related deductions, negative gearing, capital gains tax discount, and 
the Senior Australian Tax Offset. Australia relies on a comprehensive tax system 
in which realised income from all sources is combined and taxed at the same rate 
according to the legislated schedule. The only exception is capital gains.8 The PIT 
schedule is progressive, with five rates (excluding the Medicare levy) ranging 
through 0%, 15%, 30%, 40% and 45% for Australian residents. The current top 
tax bracket commences at $150,000 per annum which corresponds roughly to 3.4 
times the average weekly earnings in Australia.9
In terms of aggregate revenue, the PIT has been by far the largest single tax 
in Australia for many years. In 2003–04, PIT raised a net revenue of $95.5 billion 
(ATO 2006: 10), accounting for about 67% of income tax revenue or about 48% 
of all Commonwealth tax revenue (ABS, 2006a: 647).10 Relative to the general 
government sector, PIT generated 39% of all tax revenue in 2003–04 (ABS, 2006a: 
647, Table 27.13), while relative to the entire economy, PIT accounted for 12% of 
GDP in the same year (ABS, 2006a: 670, Table 29.5).
The administration of the Australian PIT has been an immense task, primarily 
because, under the current legislation, virtually all Australian individual taxpayers are 
required to submit their annual returns to the ATO. According to the latest taxation 
statistics available, 11.0 million individual taxpayers lodged returns in 2003–04 
(ATO, 2006: 10). About 8.1 million returns (that is, 74% of the total number) were 
submitted by tax agents and 7.9 million returns (that is, 72% of the total) were lodged 
through electronic lodgment. Individual taxpayers had total income of $414.1 billion, 
taxable income of $394.7 billion and net tax payable of $95.5 billion, giving an 
overall effective PIT rate of about 24.2% for all PIT taxpayers. Individual taxpayers 
claimed $22.9 billion in total deductions, including $11.1 billion in work-related 
expenses. Further, around 7.5 million individual taxpayers were assessed to be 
entitled to tax offsets and credits totalling $11.6 billion.
To place Australia’s reliance on PIT in an international context, Table 1 presents 
8 If assets are held for 12 months or less, capital gains are included in assessable income. 
If assets are held for more than 12 months, only 50% of capital gains are included in 
assessable income. Assets acquired before 20 September 1985 are generally exempt 
from CGT.
9 In August 2006, the average of all employees’ total earnings in Australia was estimated 
at $839.50 per week, corresponding to an annual total earnings of $43,654 (ABS, 
2006b).
10 These ratios are derived by combining data provided by the ATO and ABS, which are 
not strictly compatible, possibly due to some statistical adjustments.
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PIT and social security contributions by employees as a percentage of total tax 
receipts in selected OECD member countries in 2003. Unlike most other member 
countries of the OECD, Australia does not impose social security contributions on 
employees. When social security contributions by employees are excluded from PIT 
revenue, Australia’s reliance on PIT appears to be very high relative to the rest of 
the OECD. However, when social security contributions are incorporated into the 
PIT base, Australia’s reliance on PIT becomes more similar to those found in other 
OECD member countries. While Australia has a higher reliance on PIT than Japan, 
the UK and the OECD as a whole (in terms of simple average), it relies relatively 
less on PIT than most other comparable countries such as Canada, Germany, New 
Zealand and the US.
TABLE 1
PIT AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS BY EMPLOYEES  
(AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX RECEIPTS) IN SELECTED 
OECD COUNTRIES, 2003
Country PIT
Social Security 
Contributions by 
Employees
PIT and Social 
Security 
Contributions
Australia 38.5 0.0 38.5
Canada 34.5 6.3 40.8
Germany 23.9 17.7 41.6
Japan 17.5 16.5 34.0
New Zealand 41.9 0.0 41.9
UK 28.7 7.5 36.2
US 35.3 11.7 47.0
EU Average 35.0 9.4 44.4
OECD Average 24.9 9.4 33.4
Source: OECD (2007: 60–61).
The tax literature has identified many problems in the Australian PIT–transfer 
system. Some of the main issues, discussed by reference to the traditional criteria 
for good tax policy, are summarised below.
2.1 Revenue Security
Revenue security is important, not only to those who are dependent on government 
support (welfare recipients in particular), but also to taxpayer confidence in general. 
The Australian PIT base has been undermined over the years by a combination of 
allowable deductions and exemptions, tax planning (deliberate shifting of work 
and investment from relatively highly taxed options to lower taxed options), tax 
avoidance (abusive tax planning) and tax evasion. The estimation of the extent of 
tax evasion arising from the cash economy is difficult and very sensitive to the 
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underlying assumptions used to construct it. Numerical estimates of the size of the 
Australian cash economy relative to official GDP range from 4.8% (see ABS, 2003) 
to 13.6% (see Bajada, 2001).11 Although Bajada’s estimate has been criticised by 
many as being implausibly high (see, for example, ABS, 2003 and Breusch, 2005), 
recent studies have nevertheless suggested that Australia has a resilient cash economy 
which is not particularly responsive to tax reform.
2.2 Equity
Equity in taxation is concerned with the principles of horizontal and vertical equity. 
Both these principles are violated primarily due to the use of tax planning which 
arises from a variety of tax exemptions, concessions, deductions and shelters currently 
available in the Australian PIT system. Tax planning and tax avoidance tend to favour 
high-income individuals and income from capital. In 2002–03, for example, only 9% 
of all individual taxpayers paid tax at the top marginal rate (CPA Australia, 2004: 
18). For many high-income persons, their marginal tax rate is closer to the company 
tax rate of 30% than to the maximum individual rate (including Medicare levy) of 
46.5%, due to the use of private trusts, partnerships and companies, salary sacrifice, 
negative gearing and income splitting (ACOSS, 2003: 20–22). Covick (2004) went 
as far as using the term “two nations” to describe the differences between those 
taxpayers who are part of the PAYG system and those taxpayers who use trusts, 
partnerships and companies in a complex web of tax returns by the whole family 
to minimise their overall tax liabilities. As a result, the actual overall progressivity 
(and capacity to reduce inequality) of the Australian PIT system is nowhere as high 
as suggested by the statutory tax scale.
A glaring example of the inequality of the system is the taxation of capital 
income, where a dollar of income can be taxed in seven different ways depending 
on the entity that receives the income and the concessions granted within the system. 
One dollar of capital income can be taxed at:
(a) 46.5% if it arises from an investment held for less than one year;
(b) 30% if earned by a company;
(c) 23.25% if treated as a capital gain;
(d) 15% if earned by a superannuation fund;
(e)  0% if it is a superannuation fund capital gain;
(f) 11.675% if it is a capital gain of a small business; or
(g) 0% if the asset was an operating asset of a small business, was held for 15 
years, and the proprietor is over 55 years of age.
A system which provides such a range of choices and tax regimes for an identical 
item cannot be horizontally equitable.
11 Note that the ABS estimate refers to an upper bound estimate of underground activity 
missing from GDP in 2000–2001, while Bajada’s estimate refers to the cash economy 
in December 2000. A difference in the scope of the two approaches is that the ABS 
estimate does not include illegal activity while Bajada’s estimate does.
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2.3 Efficiency
Efficiency in taxation is concerned with the loss in output resulting from tax-induced 
distortions in taxpayers’ behaviour. A traditional criticism of the Australian PIT has 
been that the maximum marginal tax rate (46.5%) is too high and the thresholds for 
the top marginal tax rates in Australia are too low (relative to domestic earnings or by 
international standards). These act as a disincentive to work effort and disadvantage 
Australia in its international competition for skilled labour. However, the problem 
of low thresholds for the top marginal tax rates has been substantially addressed by 
recent federal budgets, which raised the two top thresholds, especially the highest 
threshold, quite significantly. Using Budget and ABS data, and making adjustments 
for work related expenses, it is estimated that the top tax threshold as a multiple 
of full-time average annual earnings has risen steadily from 1.5 in 2003–04 to 2 
in 2004–05, 2.5 in 2005–06 and potentially over 3 in 2006–07 (Treasury, 2006; 
ABS, 2006b).
More persistent is the problem of high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) 
caused by the interaction between the tax and social security systems.12 Australian 
households that receive a composite income made of wage/salary and a social 
security payment related to their family status or benefit category tend to face 
very high EMTRs, which can be more than or close to 100% in some cases. High 
EMTRs act as poverty traps, which discourage unemployed adults from seeking 
work (unemployment traps), or employed adults from working longer hours (low 
income traps). Recent changes announced in federal budgets have improved the 
EMTR situation but more can still be done.
Concerning investment, the combination of the preferential treatment of owner-
occupied housing, negative gearing and the CGT discount appears to encourage an 
overinvestment in residential dwellings, particularly rental housing, with potentially 
harmful consequences, especially when financed by high levels of debt.
2.4 Simplicity
Simplicity of taxation is concerned with the operating costs (compliance and 
administrative costs) of the tax system. In this sense, the PIT system in Australia is 
complex for two main reasons already stated. First, virtually all individual taxpayers 
are required to lodge annual tax returns, irrespective of how simple or complex their 
personal tax affairs may be. Secondly, the legal complexity of the PIT gives rise to 
both high tax computational and planning costs. The growing legal complexity of 
the PIT system in Australia is also clearly evidenced by the growth of the proportion 
of individual taxpayers relying on the services of tax agents for the completion and 
lodgment of their returns. This ratio has increased tremendously from approximately 
12 In terms of interaction with the PIT, the following categories of social security payments 
are relevant: unemployment benefits, family and child benefits, pensions and sole parent 
benefits, along with a range of means-tested tax offsets like the low income offset and 
the Medicare charge phase-in provision.
Economic Analysis & Policy Vol.37 No.2, September 2007 171© 2007
38% to 40% in 1977–78 (McKinstry and Baldry, 1997) to around 74% to 77% from 
1996–97 to 2003–04 (ATO, 2006). An OECD survey conducted in 2004 (relating 
to the financial year immediately before the survey year) showed that Australia 
was the second highest agent-dependent country in the developed world (OECD, 
2005, Table 9).13 A personal taxpayer14 survey conducted by an Atax research 
team in late 1995 found that the most common reason (60.2%) for people seeking 
professional tax advice is to comply with the legal requirements of tax obligations 
(Evans et al., 1996: 12).
In this (now dated) comprehensive study of the compliance costs arising from 
federal taxes, Evans et al. (1997: 20) found that, in 1994–95, personal taxpayers 
(excluding sole traders), spent, on average, 8.5 hours per annum on tax affairs 
and almost $100 on tax adviser costs. In aggregate terms, the compliance costs 
accounted for 4% of the net income tax revenue collected from personal taxpayers. 
This does not include the tax compliance costs associated with the use of trusts, 
companies and partnerships for asset protection and tax planning purposes. When 
sole traders were included, individual compliance costs accounted for 5.6% of the 
relevant tax revenue (Evans et al., 1997: 65). Although there is no updated study of 
PIT compliance costs, it seems reasonably safe to remark that, as the overall level 
of complexity has increased, tax planning and compliance costs have not shown 
any sign of declining.
The above summary discussion suggests that a comprehensive, systemic reform 
of the Australian PIT is long overdue. The next section will discuss the principles 
of tax reform and research methodology adopted in this ARC Linkage project.
3. PRINCIPLES OF TAX REFORM
It may be helpful to briefly consider the meaning of tax reform prior to discussing 
the guiding principles of PIT reform adopted in this paper. Despite its widespread 
usage, the meaning of tax reform is neither well understood nor unambiguously 
agreed upon.15 There are two fundamental difficulties in assessing whether a tax 
change is a reform or not. Firstly, it is difficult to measure with certainty the general 
equilibrium impact of a tax change. Secondly, a genuine tax reform typically gives 
rise to both winners and losers, so that it may be difficult to determine the overall 
and specific effects of the tax change under consideration. In this paper, tax reform 
is identified and assessed in terms of the equity, efficiency and simplicity criteria 
13 According to this report, 77% of all individual income tax returns in Australia were 
prepared with the assistance of tax agents. Only Italy (with 96%) had a higher figure 
than Australia. The percentages for other jurisdictions included: Canada: 45%; Ireland: 
70%; Korea: 46%; New Zealand: 30%; UK: 53%; and USA: 56%.
14 Personal taxpayers mean individual non-business taxpayers (that is, sole traders are 
excluded).
15 For a critical examination of the meaning of tax reform, the interested reader is referred 
to Tran-Nam et al. (2006).
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for good tax policy. Given these criteria of assessment, the reform method adopted 
in this ARC Linkage project is based on two general principles: revenue neutrality 
and an incremental approach. Each of these will be elaborated in turn below.
Firstly, a specific tax reform can be either revenue neutral, revenue decreasing 
or revenue increasing. This project adopts the principle of revenue neutrality for 
three main reasons:
• politically speaking, it preserves the status quo as far as possible, so the 
proposed reform is more likely to be accepted;
• it provides a safeguard to the level of government expenditure; and
• holding tax revenue constant makes it easier to determine whether the 
proposed tax change is truly a reform or not (in this case we can focus on 
whether the social and economic costs of taxation as a result of the proposed 
change have reduced or not).
Note that the meaning of revenue neutrality is not unambiguous in the context 
of Australian PIT reform. It is capable of several different interpretations. A revenue-
neutral PIT reform can be interpreted as a PIT change that keeps the PIT burden 
(that is, ratio of PIT revenue over GDP) unchanged. It may also be interpreted as 
a PIT change that holds constant the overall tax burden (that is, ratio of total tax 
revenue over GDP). Since the GST has yielded more revenue than forecast, the 
overall tax burden in Australia has increased slightly as a result of the GST-based 
reform. Thus, a revenue-neutral PIT reform in this sense means a PIT change that 
maintains the pre-2001 level of overall tax burden, which was about 31.5% of GDP 
(see ABS, 2006a: 647, Table 27.13 and 670, Table 29.5).
In this paper, revenue neutrality is said to be achieved if the proposed PIT 
reform package generates approximately the same amounts of forecast revenue 
as the government PIT package, including bracket creep. Once chosen, revenue 
neutrality then becomes a constraint of tax reform. Note that a tax change cannot 
simultaneously satisfy revenue neutrality (in the sense of holding PIT revenue 
collection constant relative to the current regime) and the distributional constraint 
(that no group is worse off in the post-tax income sense as a result of the change). 
We must accept the fact that under a revenue-neutral tax change proposal, some 
groups stand to gain while others necessarily lose out.
Secondly, tax policy in any pluralistic, democratic society like Australia is 
typically a result of the interplay between the government, industries, labour unions 
and pressure groups that constitute the corporate state. The inertia of the tax system 
is strong, so that tax reform is often a long, strenuous and divisive process fraught 
with compromises and missed opportunities. But clearly the minimalist approach 
to PIT change adopted by the Coalition Government so far is grossly inadequate. 
Expanding the thresholds of top marginal tax rates and changes to the low income 
offset and Senior Australian Tax Offset reduce some of the disincentive problems 
associated with the PIT system, but are by themselves insufficient for developing 
a sustainable PIT model for the future.
A slow approach involving continuous small adjustments can generate a perception 
of uncertainty and/or instability and is therefore undesirable as a reform strategy. At 
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the same time, the “big bang” approach which seeks to move the current tax system 
to the “targeted” one in one large change is typically not possible, given the various 
constraints16 (especially the informational constraint) facing the tax policy makers. 
In particular, a big bang approach involving a radical PIT reform proposal such as a 
flat tax is most unlikely to be accepted by the government or the community.
This paper argues that the most viable option for PIT reform in Australia is 
the incremental approach. This approach seeks to move the current PIT system to 
the “ideal” PIT system in a series of two or three carefully crafted tax packages. 
This reform strategy is consistent with the advice offered by leading public finance 
economists such as Cedric Sandford (1993: 228). The PIT reform proposal in 
each stage of the process should be sufficiently familiar in terms of tax structure 
to be well recognised and ultimately accepted by both tax policy makers as well 
as the taxpaying community. Yet each reform proposal should also make visible 
improvements to the PIT system in terms of well defined criteria to justify its 
implementation. Because of the federal election cycle, the incremental approach 
takes a long time to complete and needs to be commenced by a government that 
enjoys broad electoral support.
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As a way to move the PIT reform debate in Australia forward, this ARC Linkage 
project employs an integrated, multi-stage research methodology. This approach 
combines various research techniques in an innovative way to take into account 
the views of virtually all stakeholders in the tax reform process: the researchers 
themselves, other tax experts, taxpayers and tax practitioners. Each stage of this 
research methodology is briefly explained below.
The first phase of the project aims at finding a specific PIT package that can 
be considered as a suitable candidate for the first stage of the incremental process 
described above. It is conducted with the aid of STINMOD version 05B. STINMOD 
is a microsimulation model of the Australian tax and transfer system, developed by 
NATSEM at the University of Canberra. This static model can be used to assess the 
immediate impact of policy changes on family incomes and government expenditures. 
As a policy tool, STINMOD can produce simulated results at the individual level. 
Thus, the distributional impact of a policy measure across different family types 
can be assessed. At the same time, estimates of the aggregate outcome can be 
derived by summing the individual results. This tool is widely used by Treasury 
and other departments to estimate the impact of public policy changes. Details of 
the components and assumptions of STINMOD are given in Lambert (1994).
The second phase of the project subjects some of the central issues and concepts 
underpinning these models to scrutiny and analysis by a panel of international tax 
experts (using a Delphi methodology), in order to establish strengths and potential 
weaknesses in the models, and seeks to establish a consensus around one single 
16 These include domestic political and institutional constraints, international trade grouping 
constraints, distributional constraints and informational constraints.
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“preferred” model. The Delphi methodology, as commonly understood in modern 
usage, “operates on the principle that several heads are better than one in making 
subjective conjectures … and that experts will make conjectures based upon rational 
judgement rather than merely guessing” (Weaver, 1971: 268). It is a dialectical 
process designed to foster the exploration and distillation of expert opinion (Helmer, 
1983). This Delphi methodology combines quantitative and qualitative techniques 
to explore future possibilities in systematic and iterative rounds of anonymous 
testing involving a panel of international experts. The experts have been drawn 
from Australia and from countries with comparable PIT regimes, such as the UK, 
the USA, Canada and New Zealand. These experts have responded to a series of 
open-ended propositions relating to the design and operation of the PIT with a view 
to establishing whether a consensus on key PIT reform issues can be developed.
The third phase of the project surveys tax community attitudes to this expert-
derived model in order to establish levels of potential resistance/acceptance by key 
stakeholders. In particular, a large-scale mail survey of taxpayers and a large-scale 
e-survey of tax practitioners will be conducted. The taxpayer questionnaire will be 
sent by ordinary mail to about 4,000 Australian individuals selected at random and 
stratified by their income levels. This questionnaire seeks to obtain participants’ 
demographic and economic backgrounds, their attitudes toward general PIT reform 
options and, more specifically, their acceptance/rejection of the preferred PIT model 
derived during the first phase of this project. Particular attention will be paid to 
ensure that a minimum response rate of 20% will be obtained (for example, accurate 
addresses, questionnaire design, pilot testing, cover letter) and a high degree of 
representativeness of the effective sample (for example, through stratification of 
the relevant population). The e-survey will be sent by email to about 3,000 tax 
practitioners. The participants of this tax practitioner e-survey will be chosen at 
random from the membership database of CPA Australia, the industrial partner in 
this ARC Linkage project.
In summary, the three major methodologies involved – micro-simulation, 
Delphi methodology and survey – feed off each other and into each other as an 
iterative loop. The results of the Delphi study and surveys can be used to fine tune 
or revise the preferred model to reflect the expert and community feedback. 
5. PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM: A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL
This section reports on the process and findings of the first phase of the ARC Linkage 
project. In this process, the government’s 2006–07 PIT system for Australian residents 
(as summarised in Table 2) is taken to be the benchmark for comparison. STINMOD 
is first used to simulate the aggregate revenue and distribution of disposable income 
associated with this benchmark. STINMOD is then used to construct and test a series 
of hypothetical PIT packages in order to establish which packages can best deliver the 
required policy outcomes. Before proceeding to state the preferred model obtained, 
it is worthwhile discussing briefly the crucial features of STINMOD modelling and 
the general approach to constructing PIT reform packages.
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TABLE 2
THE 2006–07 PIT STRUCTURE*
Taxable Income MTR (%)
$0 – $6,000 0
$6,001 – $25,000 15
$25,001 –$75,000 30
$75,001 –$150,000 40
more than $150,000 45
Low Income Offset $600 for annual taxable income < $25,000
*excluding Medicare levy.
Source: Treasury (2006, Table 1).
STINMOD contains most of the significant tax and social security elements, 
and its database is drawn from the last population census. It is based on a number of 
assumptions such as an inflation rate of 2.5% per annum, a population growth rate of 
1.5% per annum and a taxable income growth rate of 3.5% per annum. STINMOD 
is a static model in the sense that it does not take into account changes in labour 
supply, saving and investment (second round effects) in response to changes in the 
PIT–transfer system.17 As a result, the estimated results of any PIT package which 
improves efficiency tend to be on the conservative side. STINMOD allows users 
to vary the tax rate but not the tax base in an automatic fashion. To estimate total 
revenue and distributional impacts arising from tax base broadening, additional 
calculations using spreadsheets need to be made. The combined effects of tax rate 
changes and tax base broadening are then obtained by adding the two separate 
effects. This process yields a close approximation of the impact of a simultaneous 
change in tax rates and tax base.
As stated previously, any revenue-neutral PIT package that exhibits a familiar 
progressive tax scale is said to be feasible. Obviously there are many feasible PIT 
packages that can be constructed by STINMOD. To discriminate feasible packages 
further, we employ the well accepted principle of tax base broadening and tax rate 
lowering. Base broadening helps not only to fund lower rates, but also to reduce 
tax-induced distortions. Lowering tax rates, particularly EMTRs, may reduce the 
obstacles to people’s willingness to work. This efficiency enhancing measure is 
desirable, especially in the context of population aging that will confront Australia 
in the future. 
The current Australian PIT system has many special exemptions and deductions 
which reduce the tax base, have little or no justification on efficiency grounds, add 
to complexity and are of much more value to those on higher incomes. Three main 
17 In a recent study of the impact of marginal tax rates on labour supply, Gruen (2006) 
found that Australia’s high-income earners are less responsive to tax cuts than those on 
middle and lower incomes.
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PIT base broadening measures are:18
• removal of most, if not all, deductions for work-related expenses;
• removal of concessional tax rates on capital gains; and
• limiting tax relief for negatively-geared investment deductions to income 
and capital gains derived from those investments.
In terms of the rate structure, among these competing packages, it seems useful 
to focus on a PIT package with the following properties:
• a lower number of tax rates, for example, three rates; and
• a smaller gap between the top marginal tax rate and the company tax rate.
Taking the current PIT–transfer system as the benchmark, STINMOD was used 
to construct and examine a large number of hypothetical PIT packages. Using the 
principles of incrementality and revenue neutrality as primary selection criteria, 
and tax base broadening, lower tax rates and smaller number of tax brackets as 
secondary selection criteria, our ‘preferred’ PIT package can be summarised in 
Table 3 as follows.
TABLE 3
PROPOSED PIT PACKAGE*
Taxable Income MTR (%)
$0 – $24,599 13
$24,600 –$69,999 26
$70,000 or more 38
Low Income Offset $900 for annual taxable income < $25,000
Work Related Deductions (WRDs) Remove all WRDs and provide a $300 rebate to each taxpayer who claims WRDs
CGT discount Remove CGT discount and exempt the first $5,000 of capital gains per annum
* excluding Medicare levy.
The main features of the proposed PIT package are as follows: 
• Tax base broadening: WRDs and CGT discount are practically abolished. 
They are replaced by some simple and plausible rebate or exemption, 
respectively. Due to the lack of disaggregated data, the effect of quarantining 
interest deductions for negatively geared assets cannot be quantified with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy. Thus, the partial removal of negative gearing 
was not attempted at this stage of the project.19
18 Other base broadening measures could potentially include the removal of concessional 
Fringe Benefits Tax treatment of motor vehicles, concessional tax rates on many forms 
of lump sum remuneration, remote area concessions and income averaging. However, 
these are not considered in this present paper.
19 If disaggregated data on negative gearing is made available by the ATO, the effect of 
the partial removal of negative gearing can be modelled. This would be an appropriate 
task for the next PIT proposal.
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• Tax rate structure: The proposed statutory tax rate structure is somewhat flatter 
than the benchmark structure. There are only three rates as opposed to five rates 
in the current PIT system and the proposed top rate is lower than the current 
top rate (38% vs 45%).
• Tax free threshold: There is no tax free threshold in the proposed package. 
Maintaining or increasing the current tax free threshold is very costly and 
relatively more beneficial to high-income individuals. The adverse effect of the 
removal of the tax free threshold on low-income individuals is compensated 
with an increase of $300 in the low income offset (from $600 to $900 for annual 
taxable incomes below $25,000).
It is now time to examine the above PIT proposal more closely.
5.1 Revenue Impact
First and foremost, it is necessary to demonstrate that the proposed package is 
revenue neutral in the sense that it generates approximately the same revenue as 
the benchmark (the 2006–07 PIT system). This is shown in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4
REVENUE IMPACT PF THE PROPOSED PIT PACKAGE  
($ MIL), 2006–07
Government loses from change in tax rates and thresholds 5,609.96
Government gains from removing CGT Discount –3,988.00
Government gains from removing WRDs –3,544.65
Loss from extra $300 low income offset 2,655.00
Final Impact: Government loses 732.31
Sources: STINMOD and authors’ own calculations.
Keeping in mind that the PIT revenue in 2006–07 would be close to $100 billion, 
Table 4 shows that the proposed PIT package is approximately revenue neutral. 
Note that the revenue gap between the benchmark and the proposed package tends 
to be overstated due to the static nature of STINMOD. Since STINMOD does not 
capture the efficiency enhancement of the proposed package (to be shown later), 
the forecast revenue of the proposed PIT package would be slightly understated, 
causing the revenue gap to be slightly overstated.
Strictly speaking, it is also necessary to demonstrate the revenue sustainability 
of the proposed reform in the future. This is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
Suffice it to say that bracket creep and the broadening of the tax base would guarantee 
revenue sustainability into the future.
5.2 Distributional Impact
The distributional impact of our PIT proposal, by disposable income decile and 
family type in 2006–07, is summarised in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
CHANGE IN WEEKLY DISPOSABLE INCOME ($), 2006–07
Income decile
Family type
Married with 
no children
Married with 
children Sole parent Single adult
One 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Two 4.24 3.80 1.63 3.56
Three 3.92 3.49 1.83 3.51
Four 4.17 1.30 1.39 1.30
Five 3.39 0.00 8.94 0.33
Six 1.24 3.07 10.34 6.09
Seven 0.77 1.30 8.54 9.53
Eight 5.78 6.14 13.39 17.01
Nine 10.02 5.56 7.10 13.08
Ten –19.38 –11.65 6.87 9.94
Sources: STINMOD and authors’ own calculations.
Under the proposed package, Australian residents, except married couples in 
the top income decile, are on the average either no worse off (people in the bottom 
decile) or better off in the sense of disposable income. Since the proposed package 
redistributes income from the top income group to lower income groups, the overall 
level of post-tax income inequality (as indicated by a summary measure such as 
the Gini coefficient) is likely to decrease.20
5.3 Efficiency Impact
STINMOD is unable to compute the efficiency gains or losses associated with any 
PIT package. However, from a theoretical perspective, as our proposal has a flatter 
tax rate structure, it should have a beneficial effect on labour supply. In particular, 
the gap between the proposed top marginal tax rate (38%) and the company tax 
rate (30%) is much smaller than that between the current top rate (45%) and the 
company rate. This would greatly reduce taxpayers’ incentive to engage in wasteful 
and distorting tax arbitrage and planning activities.
To substantiate the claim that the proposed PIT package has a lower tax rate 
structure, the EMTRs for 10 different family types at varying levels of private 
income are computed. The EMTR for a particular family type is calculated using 
the following formula:
EMTR = 1 – Change in family disposable income/Change in family earnings
where disposable income is defined as the total amount of income, including 
government benefits, received by a family, less any tax paid. Because of the 
20 The estimation of the Gini index typically requires unit record data which is not available 
from STINMOD.
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interaction between income tax and the social security system, the EMTR can be 
close to or can exceed 100% at present.
The detailed EMTR results are presented in the Appendix. Without base 
broadening, the proposed tax scale gives rise to higher EMTRs in only six cases 
out of a total of 131 cases in this simulation exercise. In all other cases, the EMTRs 
are either unchanged or reduced. When base broadening is taken into account, for 
illustrative purposes, the EMTRS are estimated for a sample of only four major 
family types. Since the top three disposable income deciles do not have ETMR 
problems, we focus on the bottom seven deciles. Further, only the removal of WRDs 
is taken into account, as CGT changes do not affect the bottom seven deciles. The 
simulation results show that base broadening has no impact on the EMTRs faced 
by those selected family types belonging to the bottom seven disposable income 
deciles. The results in the Appendix suggest that, in terms of EMTR, the proposed 
PIT package outperforms the current PIT system in almost all cases.
5.4 Simplicity Impact
An important benefit of this PIT proposal is its simplification potential. Tax base 
broadening through a partial or complete removal of WRDs and CGT discount will 
reduce compliance costs (both computational and tax planning costs) to personal 
taxpayers, administrative costs to the ATO and revenue losses to the government 
(arising from allowable deductions for the costs of managing tax affairs). Focusing on 
WRDs alone, this is so because, under the existing structure, many personal taxpayers 
claim WRDs (6.8 million claimants in 2003–04)21 and the time spent on keeping 
records of deductions is the largest single compliance task performed by personal 
taxpayers (see Evans et al., 1996: 37). Under a number of conservative assumptions, 
Vu and Tran-Nam (2006) estimated the reduction in aggregate tax operating costs 
of PIT due to the removal of WRDs alone at about $1.03 billion in 2002–03. This 
monetary estimate does not include possible reductions in psychological costs that 
may arise from the elimination of WRDs.
A further benefit is that the PIT proposal can pave the way for reduced annual 
filing for personal taxpayers, especially those with less complex tax affairs, as 
persuasively argued by Evans (2004). He identified key ‘enablers’ that permit a 
simpler tax regime for most individual taxpayers in New Zealand and the UK:
• a small number of tax rates (sometimes without a tax-free threshold);
• a cumulative, comprehensive and accurate tax withholding regime at source; 
and
• no deductions for work related expenses.
Since tax rate simplification and the removal of WRDs are already included in 
the proposed PIT package, Australia simply needs to further strengthen its existing 
21 This figure refers to allowed claims only. Those personal taxpayers whose WRD claims 
are not allowed would also incur compliance costs in terms of record keeping and tax 
return preparation.
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PAYG provisions (particularly in respect to contractors who are akin to employees) 
and introduce a more comprehensive tax withholding regime on domestic interest 
and dividend income.
6. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
The current Australian PIT system suffers from major weaknesses relating to the 
traditional criteria for good tax policy. However, since tax reform means different 
things to different people, finding a consensus among a range of diverse options 
has proven very difficult to date. Recognising the importance of PIT reform, the 
ARC awarded an ARC Linkage grant to a research team at Atax, University of New 
South Wales. The aim of this project is to develop a sustainable PIT which not only 
achieves improved equity, efficiency and simplicity, but which also commands 
greater community acceptance and support. To this end, the Atax team utilises 
an integrated, multi-step research methodology which includes microsimulation 
modelling, a Delphi study and large-scale surveys. This paper reports on the process 
and outcomes of the first phase of this project.
In the first phase of this ARC Linkage project, STINMOD, a microsimulation 
model has been employed to construct and test a large number of feasible PIT 
packages in order to establish which package(s) can best deliver the required policy 
outcomes. The set of all feasible reform packages is defined by two principles of 
reform: revenue neutrality and incrementality. The preferred PIT package broadens 
the tax base by essentially removing WRDs and the CGT discount to fund lower tax 
rates (top marginal tax rate of only 38%). The preferred package also removes the 
tax-free threshold, but compensates those who would lose most by increasing the 
low income offset from $600 to $900 per annum. This proposed package is found 
to be revenue neutral and to substantially outperform the current PIT system with 
respect to the traditional criteria for good tax policy. It improves the disposable 
income of virtually all personal taxpayers and is less intrusive and distorting of 
economic decisions than the current system. The proposed PIT package appears to 
be an excellent candidate to move the reform debate forward.
PIT reform of a systemic and coherent nature is a long and difficult process. 
The conception and enactment of tax reform requires strong political will and 
control. Since the process of tax reform may involve several governments, it must 
start as soon as possible. In fact, the current Federal Coalition Government is in 
an excellent position to initiate this reform process. Politically speaking, it enjoys 
broad electoral support and controls the Senate. Economically speaking, favourable 
fiscal conditions currently prevail and the external imbalance has not yet created 
an economic crisis. Thus, the time for PIT reform is now and it would be a sadly 
wasted opportunity if the Government does not push ahead with comprehensive 
PIT reform quite soon.
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF EMTRs BY FAMILY TYPE UNDER  
ALTERNATIVE TAX REGIMES
Family type 1: Couple both working with no dependant
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
20,436 83.9 81.9 –2.0
23,972 68.9 66.9 –2.0
24,596 61.5 72.5 11.0
24,960 80.5 76.5 –4.0
35,256 95.5 91.5 –4.0
35,724 35.5 31.5 –4.0
99,996 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 2: Couple both working with one dependant
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
19,084 63.0 61.0 –2.0
24,960 82.0 78.0 –4.0
26,416 90.9 86.9 –4.0
28,548 102.9 98.9 –4.0
31,772 95.5 91.5 –4.0
35,724 35.5 31.5 –4.0
38,428 55.5 51.5 –4.0
51,220 31.5 27.5 –4.0
74,984 41.5 39.5 –2.0
90,688 71.5 69.5 –2.0
94,744 41.5 39.5 –2.0
99,996 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 3: Couple both working with two dependants
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
19,084 63.0 61.0 –2.0
24,960 82.0 78.0 –4.0
28,548 94.0 90.0 –4.0
32,396 102.9 98.9 –4.0
35,724 54.0 50.0 –4.0
37,024 35.5 31.5 –4.0
(continued next page)
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38,428 55.5 51.5 –4.0
63,960 31.5 27.5 –4.0
94,276 71.5 69.5 –2.0
101,452 72.5 70.5 –2.0
102,388 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 4: Couple one working with no dependant
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 60.0 60.0 0.0
21,268 15.0 13.0 –2.0
24,960 34.0 26.0 –8.0
28,912 54.0 50.0 –4.0
31,252 35.5 31.5 –4.0
39,988 31.5 27.5 –4.0
74,984 41.5 39.5 –2.0
99,996 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 5: Couple one working with one dependant
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
19,084 63.0 61.0 –2.0
24,960 82.0 78.0 –4.0
26,416 90.9 86.9 –4.0
28,548 102.9 98.9 –4.0
31,772 95.5 91.5 –4.0
35,724 35.5 31.5 –4.0
38,428 55.5 51.5 –4.0
51,220 31.5 27.5 –4.0
74,984 41.5 39.5 –2.0
90,688 71.5 69.5 –2.0
94,744 41.5 39.5 –2.0
99,996 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 6: Couple one working with two dependants
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
19,084 63.0 61.0 –2.0
24,960 82.0 78.0 –4.0
28,548 94.0 90.0 –4.0
32,396 102.9 98.9 –4.0
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35,724 54.0 50.0 –4.0
37,076 35.5 31.5 –4.0
38,428 55.5 51.5 –4.0
63,960 31.5 27.5 –4.0
94,276 71.5 69.5 –2.0
101,452 72.5 70.5 –2.0
102,388 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 7: Sole parent with one dependant
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
22,360 15.0 13.0 –2.0
24,960 34.0 30.0 –4.0
31,564 54.0 50.0 –4.0
34,164 35.5 31.5 –4.0
38,428 55.5 51.5 –4.0
51,220 31.5 27.5 –4.0
90,688 71.5 69.5 –2.0
94,744 41.5 39.5 –2.0
99,996 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
102,388 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 8: Sole parent with two dependants
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
22,360 15.0 13.0 –2.0
24,960 34.0 30.0 –4.0
34,268 54.0 50.0 –4.0
37,024 35.5 31.5 –4.0
38,428 55.5 51.5 –4.0
63,960 31.5 27.5 –4.0
94,276 71.5 69.5 –2.0
101,452 72.5 70.5 –2.0
102,388 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 9: Pensioner aged couple with no dependant
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6,032.0 40.0 40.0 0.0
12,532.0 67.1 82.4 15.3
13,572.0 52.3 67.6 15.3
(continued next page)
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14,300.0 41.2 56.5 15.3
29,328.0 67.9 65.1 –2.8
63,232.0 65.2 62.0 –3.2
64,272.0 31.5 27.5 –4.0
64,636.0 31.5 27.5 –4.0
99,996.0 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000.0 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Family type 10: Single adult
Annual private 
income ($)
EMTR (%) under 
benchmark regime
EMTR (%) under 
proposed regime
Change in EMTR 
(%)
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,612 50.0 50.0 0.0
6,500 75.0 60.0 –15.0
11,544 74.0 81.0 7.0
15,028 66.6 73.6 7.0
20,852 16.5 14.5 –2.0
24,960 35.5 31.5 –4.0
49,972 32.5 28.5 –4.0
74,984 42.5 40.5 –2.0
104,000 42.5 40.5 –2.0
Disposal income
($ pw) without 
base broadening
Disposal income
($ pw) with base 
broadening
EMTRs with 
base broadening
Couple 1 working with 2 dependants
Low income (13% MTR) 641.00 644.77 Unchanged
Middle income (26% MTR) 738.00 736.43 Unchanged
Upper income (38% MTR) 1,124.00 1,111.95 Unchanged
Couple both working with 2 dependants
Low income (13% MTR) 726.00 729.77 Unchanged
Middle income (26% MTR) 823.00 821.43 Unchanged
Upper income (38% MTR) 1,150.00 1,137.95 Unchanged
Sole parent with 1 dependent
Low income (13% MTR) 443.00 447.72 Unchanged
Middle income (26% MTR) 739.00 737.43 Unchanged
Upper income (38%MTR) 1,124.00 1,111.95 Unchanged
Single adult with no dependent
Low income (13% MTR) 291.00 295.72 Unchanged
Middle income (26% MTR) 426.81 427.78 Unchanged
Upper income (38% MTR) 1,025.00 1,012.95 Unchanged
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